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NOTES
Awarding Attorney's Fees to Pro Se Litigants
Under Rule 11

Jeremy D. Spector
INTRODUCTION
Among the myriad rules and statutes designed to curb litigation
abuse, Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("FRCP") is
"the most widely used and most controversial of the sanctions
rules."1 The increased use of Rule ll2 during the last fifteen years3
1. Melissa L. Nelken, Introduction to SECTION OF LmG., AMERICAN BAR AssN., SANC
TIONS: RuLE 11 AND OnmR POWERS 1 {Melissa L. Nelken ed .. 3d ed. 1992) [hereinafter
SANCTIONs]; see also GREGORY P. JOSEPH, SANCTIONS: THE FEDERAL LAW OF LmGATION
ABusE § 1, at 2 {1989) {finding Rule 11 to be "the most prominent provision authorizing
sanctions for litigation abuse"). For other views on the "controversy" over Rule 11, see
THOMAS E. WILLGING, THE RULE 11 SANCTIONING PROCESS 169-70 (1988) {finding that over
75% of judges and 67% of attorneys support the rule); William W Schwarzer, Rule I1 Revis
ited, 101 HARV. L. R:Bv. 1013, 1014 n.3 {1988) (reporting that 93% of judges and 77% of
attorneys agreed that Rule 11 sanctions are necessary to deter frivolous arguments (citing
NEw YoRK STATE BAR AssN., REPoRT OF THE CoMMrITEE ON FEDERAL COURTS:
SANCTIONS AND ArroRNEYs' FEES 3 (June 8, 1987))).
2. Rule 11 requires a party to certify that the legal and factual contentions in any plead
ings or other papers she submits to the court are not frivolous and that she is not offering the
papers for any improper purpose. See FED. R. Crv. P. ll(b). The rule also sets forth a list of
potential sanctions against any party who violates it; included in the list is an award of rea
sonable attorney's fees to the offended party. See FED. R. Civ. P. ll{c). Rule 11 provides in
pertinent part:
(c) SANCTIONS. If, after notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond, the court deter
mines that subdivision {b) [proscribing improper or frivolous papers] has been violated,
the court may, subject to the conditions stated below, impose an appropriate sanction
upon the attorneys, law firms, or parties that have violated subdivision {b) or are respon
sible for the violation.
{1) How Initiated.
(A) By Motion.
If warranted, the court may award to the party prevailing on the
motion the reasonable expenses and attorney's fees incurred m presenting or oppos
ing the motion.
•

.

•

(2) Nature of Sanction; Limitations. A sanction imposed for violation of this rule shall
be limited to what is sufficient to deter repetition of such conduct or comparable con
duct by others similarly situated. Subject to the limitations in subparagraphs (A) and
(B), the sanction may consist of, or include, directives of a nonmonetary nature, an
order to pay a penalty into court, or, if imposed on motion and warranted for effective
deterrence, an order directing payment to the movant of some or all of the reasonable
attorney's fees and other expenses incurred as a direct result of the violation.
3. From the inception of the FRCP in 1938 until 1983, there were only a few dozen pub
lished cases discussing the rule. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Sanctions, Symmetry, and Safe
Harbors: Limiting Misapplication of Rule 11 by Harmonizing It with Pre-Verdict Dismissal
Devices, 60 FORDHAM L. R:Bv. 257, 257 (1991). Between August 1, 1983, when Rule 11 was
amended to make the imposition of sanctions mandatory upon a finding of a violation, and
August 1, 1985 alone, there were more than 200 reported decisions. See Melissa L. Nelken,

2308

June 1997]

Note - Attorney's Fees

2309

and the recent proliferation of fee-shifting provisions in federal
statutes4 have led to an onslaught of motions for attorney's fees in
the federal district courts.5 Simultaneously, these courts are seeing
an increasing number of pro se litigants appear before them.6 The
confluence of these two trends has produced the seemingly para
doxical result of pro se parties seeking attorney's fees awards.7
Over the past twenty years, pro se litigants have attempted to
avail themselves of the attorney's fees provisions contained in such
statutes as the Equal Access to Justice Act ("EAJA"),s the
Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA"),9 and the Civil Rights
Attorney's Fees Awards Act("§ 1988").10 Th�y have met with lim
ited success.11 Very few pro se parties, however, have sought simiSanctions Under Amended Federal Rule 11 - Some "Chilling" Problems in the Struggle
Between Compensation and Punishment, 74 GEO. LJ. 1313, 1326 (1986). Rule 11 was
amended in 1993 to make sanctions permissive again - and not mandatory - and to pro
vide for a 21-day safe-harbor period during which litigants could retract the violative paper
without incurring any sanction. See FED. R. CIV. P. ll(c). Although there is no available
data on this point, one may assume that since the 1993 amendment, the number of Rule 11
motions filed and Rule 11 sanctions granted has decreased significantly.
4. A fee-shifting provision allows a litigant to recover attorney's fees from the opposing
party; usually these provisions are enacted to encourage meritorious actions by plaintiffs who
otherwise would not have adequate means to bring a lawsuit. See infra section III.A (discuss
ing the goals of several fee-shifting statutes). Such provisions, of course, constitute excep
tions to the default American Rule, under which each party to a lawsuit pays its own costs
and fees. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Socy., 421 U.S. 240 (1975). As of
1993, there were 153 federal statutes that provided for a fees award. See ALBA CoNTE,
ArroRNEYFEE AWARDS § 28.01 (2d ed. 1993).
5. One court has opined, "[t]o the old adage that death and taxes share a certain inevita
ble character, federal judges may be excused for adding attorneys' fees cases." Kennedy v.
Whitehurst, 690 F.2d 951, 952 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
6. A pro se litigant is one who appears on "one's own behalf . . . as in the case of one who
does not retain a lawyer and appears for himself in court." BLACK'S LAw D1cnoNARY 1221
(6th ed. 1990).
In 1993, pro se parties appeared in approximately 16,800 appeals in the federal courts.
See STATISTICS DIVISION, ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF nm U.S. CoUR'IS, PR.o SE APPEALS:
PR.o SE CASE PROCESSING IN nm U.S. CoUR'IS OF APPEALS 3 (July 1995). The
Administrative Office does not keep track of the number of pro se parties at the district court
level. Approximately 27% of the pro se appeals were civil filings, and approximately 66%
were prisoner cases. See id. at 4. By 1996, the number of pro se appeals - cases in which
either the appellant, the appellee, or both, proceeded without an attorney - had risen to
22,258. See Statistics Division, Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Pro Se Table B-9A,
at 1 (Sept. 30, 1996) (reporting data for the twelve months ending September 30, 1996)
(unpublished data on file with author).
7. The paradox, of course, manifests itself in the assumption that a pro se litigant, who
has not hired an attorney, could possibly recover attorney's fees.
8. 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1994 & Supp. I 1997).
9. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E) (1994).
10. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (1994) (providing fees for cases involving, inter alia, § 1983).
11. See, e.g., Kay v. Ehrler, 499 U.S. 432 (1991) (denying fees under§ 1988); Benavides v.
Bureau of Prisons, 993F.2d 257 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (denying fees under theFOIA); Crooker v.
EPA, 763F.2d 16 (1st Cir. 1985) (per curiatn) (denying fees under the EAJA); Cazalas v. U.S.
Dept. of Justice, 709F.2d 1051 (5th Cir. 1983) (denying fees under the FOIA). Most courts
that deny fees requests under these statutes rely on both statutory language and legislative
intent. See infra Part III.
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lar awards under FRCP 11.12 For this reason, the question of
whether a court can award fees to a pro se party under Rule 11 has
had little opportunity to percolate in judicial opinions and academic
literature.
In the three cases in which courts have examined this issue, the
decisions are split as to whether or not to award the fees.13 As with
the statutory fee-shifting provisions, the debate in the Rule 11 con
text pits arguments based on policy against arguments based on lan
guage. Those who support the award contend that granting
attorney's fees furthers Congress's intent of deterring conduct that
violates Rule 11; those who disfavor the award assert that the words
attorney's fees necessarily contemplate the existence of an attorney
client relationship. Therefore, they conclude, by definition a pro se
litigant is not entitled to the fees award.
This Note argues that courts should grant a pro se litigant rea
sonable attorney's fees when the opposing party has violated Rule
11.14 Part I examines the goals of Rule 11 and concludes that Con
gress intended deterrence of abusive practices to drive the Rule 11
inquiry. Other, less important goals that inform the analysis include
compensation of the offended party and punishment of the offend
ing party. Part II discusses the factors that influence a judge in
choosing a particular sanction and demonstrates that both practical
and policy-oriented criteria support an award of attorney's fees
12.

See infra note 13.

13. Only one published and two unpublished decisions discuss an award of attorney's fees
to a pro se litigant under Rule 11. See Committe v. Dennis Reimer Co., 150 F.R.D. 495 (D.
Vt 1993) (denying fees, though conceding that an award would further the underlying policy
of the rule), discussed infra notes 60-62 and accompanying text; Salamon v. Messina, No. frl
C-2097, 1991 U.S. Dist LEXIS 6118 (N.D. Ill. May 1, 1991) (denying fees on grounds that
movant acted pro se), affd., Nos. 91-2248, 91-2400, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 5884 (7th Cir. Mar.
25, 1997), discussed infra note 62; Rynkiewicz v. Jeanes Hosp., Civ. A. No. 86-5209, 1987 WL
7842 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 11, 19fr/) (awarding fees in light of Rule ll's goals), discussed infra notes
42-44 and accompanying text); cf. Chemiakin v. Yefimov, 932 F.2d 124 (2d Cir. 1991) (award
ing attorney's fees to a pro se litigant under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38), dis
cussed infra note 52. The Committe court observed: "Although the Court is certain that this
question has been presented to the federal courts previously, it has been unable to find a
discussion of this precise issue in the reported case law." Committe, 150 F.R.D. at 501.
It is unclear why pro se litigants have not sought fees under Rule 11 more often. It may
be that, because these parties often are not trained attorneys, they do not catch those
instances in which the opposition files a frivolous or harassing paper. Nonetheless, given the
flurry of pro se activity under the fee-shifting statutes, one might expect to see Rule 11 fees
petitions being filed more frequently. Anecdotal evidence and the paucity of reported cases,
however, suggest that pro se parties are not making these motions. See Telephone Interview
with Judy Christie, Administrative Manager, United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Michigan (June 18, 1997) (stating that she could not recall ever having seen such a
motion).
14. This Note assumes throughout that the trial judge has already determined that one
party has violated Rule 11 and that sanctions are warranted. The Note therefore is limited to
that part of the Rule 11 inquiry in which the judge chooses exactly what sanction to impose.
For an excellent discussion of the criteria informing the violation analysis, see SANcnoNs,
supra note 1. See also JOSEPH, supra note 1, § 3, at 29-30.
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even when the movant acts pro se. Part m contrasts the policy of
Rule 11 with the goals of the fee-shifting provisions in three federal
statutes.15 Part ID concludes that, although courts almost uni
formly deny pro se litigants fees under those statutes, the policies
behind the fee-shifting provisions do not implicate the concerns
addressed by Rule 11; therefore, courts are not bound by the cases
denying fees under those statutes. Finally, Part IV suggests a means
of calculating the ultimate award to the pro se litigant.
I.

THE

GoAL(s)

OF RuLE 11

Deterrence must underlie any Rule 11 decision because "the
purpose of Rule 11 sanctions is to deter" abusive practices and friv
olous arguments.16 The 1983 amendments to the rule reinforced
this notion by adding the word "sanctions" to the rule's title.17 In
making this change, the committee intended to "stress[ ] a deterrent
orientation" for courts addressing violations of Rule 11.18 Finally,
the Supreme Court has recently declared that "the central purpose
of Rule 11 is to deter baseless filings."19
The Supreme Court may recognize punishment as an additional
rationale for imposing a Rule 11 sanction,20 even though its recent
cases have emphasized deterrence. Moreover, the advisory com
mittee has previously noted that "punishment of a violation . . . is
part of the court's responsibility for securing the system's effective
operation."21 Though several lower courts and commentators have
echoed this position,22 they have not always seen punishment as a
15. Tue three statutes that have formed the bulk of the case law discussing awards of
attorney's fees to pro se litigants are the EAJA, the FOIA, and § 1988. See supra notes 8-10
and accompanying text.
16. See FED. R. Crv. P. 11 advisory committee's note para. 13; see also Fred A. Smith
Lumber Co. v. Edidin, 845 F.2d 750, 752 (7th Cir. 1988). Rule 11 provides: "A sanction
imposed for violation of this rule shall be limited to what is sufficient to deter repetition of
such conduct
" FED. R. CIV. P. ll(c)(2). Tue long-term goals of the rule include increas
ing the professionalism of the bar and ensuring that parties bring only legitimate disputes to
the court. See Wn.LGING, supra note 1, at 172.
.

.

•

.

17. Tue rule's full title is "Signing of Pleadings, Motions, and Other Papers;
Representations to Court; Sanctions." FED. R. CIV P. 11.
18. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee's note para. 12 (1983 amendment).
19. Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 533, 552
(1991) (quoting Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 393 (1990) (internal quota
tion marks omitted)); cf. In re Yagman (Brown v. Baden), 796 F.2d 1165, 1183 (9th Cir. 1986)
(noting that Rule ll's "primary purpose
is to deter subsequent abuses").
20. See Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entertainment Group, 493 U.S. 120, 126 (1989)
(finding that Rule ll's "purpose is not reimbursement but 'sanction'").
21. FED. R. CIV P. 11 advisory committee's note para. 14 (1983 amendment). Although
the 1993 committee note does not contain similar language, it does not renounce the punish
ment rationale found in this earlier comment.
22. See, e.g., In re Kunstler (Robeson Defense Comm. v. Britt), 914 F.2d 505, 522 (4th
Cir. 1990) (noting that punishment and compensation are valid goals, but that courts should
focus on deterrence); McMahon v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 896 F.2d 17, 21 (2d Cir.
.

.

.

.

•
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goal in and of itself as much as a means of achieving the deterrence
objective.23 Given that view, and considering the Court's and advi
sory committee's hesitancy to rely solely on a punishment-based
theory, courts should consider punishment only as a secondary fac
tor in the Rule 11 sanction analysis.
Though also subordinate to the deterrence goal, a third, com
pensatory objective inheres in the rule as well.24 Providing for a
sanction such as attorney's fees - whose amount correlates to the
expenses incurred by the offended party - appears to suggest a
policy more akin to compensation than deterrence.2s The commit
tee note makes clear, however, that a Rule 11 sanction, though
potentially calculated on the basis of the movant's monetary
expenditures, still has deterrence as its primary objective.26 Thus "a
district court may take into account compensation of other parties

1990) (same); Danik, Inc. v. Hartmarx Corp., 875 F.2d 890, 895 (D.C. Cir. 1989) ("Rule 11
sanctions
are
punitive and deterrent in purpose {though they are also compensatory in
effect)."), modified sub nom. Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384 {1990);
Westmoreland v. CBS, Inc., 770 F.2d 1168, 1180 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (commenting that Rule ll's
two goals are punishment and deterrence (citing William W Schwarzer, Sanctions Under the
New Federal Rule 11
A Closer Look, 104 F.R.D. 181, 201 {1985))); Schwarzer, supra, at
185 (contending that the rule "is aimed at deterring and, if necessary, punishing improper
conduct rather than merely compensating the prevailing party"); id. at 201 {"The rule reflects
a dual purpose: compensating the offended party for the expenses caused by a violation as
well as penalizing the offender to achieve
deterrence.").
•

.

.

. • .

-

.

•

•

23. See, e.g., Donaldson v. Clark, 819 F.2d 1551, 1556 {11th Cir. 1987) (en bane) (citing
FED. R. CIV P. 11 advisory committee's note para. 12 {1983 amendment)); Oliveri v. Thomp
son, 803 F.2d 1265, 1281 {2d Cir. 1986).
.

24. See Salamon v. Messina, No. 87-C-2097, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6118, at *2 (N.D. Ill.
May 1, 1991) ("Rule 11 sanctions are designed to serve three purposes: (1) to compensate
(2) to punish
and (3) to deter
"), affd., 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 5884 (7th Cir. Mar. 25,
1997); JOSEPH, supra note 1, § 16(C){l) {claiming that courts "uniformly accept the multiple
- deterrent, compensatory and punitive - purposes of the Rule," although deterrence cer
tainly remains the principal goal); see also cases cited supra note 22.
• • •

•

.

.

•

.

.

•

Support for the compensatory rationale has endured notwithstanding the advisory com
mittee's assertion that "the purpose of Rule 11 sanctions is to deter rather than to compen
sate." FED. R. CIV P. 11 advisory committee's note para. 13; cf. Pavelic & LeFlore, 493 U.S.
at 126 (stating that "[t]he purpose of the provision in question . . . is not reimbursement but
'sanction.' "). The committee note itself, however, provides a basis for the broader interpre
tation of the rule's purposes: in listing the factors to be considered in choosing the sanction,
the committee includes one criterion that is compensatory in nature - the effect of the
violation on the expense of the litigation. See FED. R. CIV P. 11 advisory committee's note
para. 12.
.

.

One court has ventured that the rule "effectively picks up the torts of abuse of process
and malicious prosecution." Szabo Food Serv., Inc. v. Canteen Corp., 823 F.2d 1073, 1083
(7th Cir. 1987). Under this rubric, the compensatory element would receive more attention.
No other court, however, has relied on this language from Szabo; furthermore, the Supreme
Court expressly rejected the malicious-prosecution analogy in Business Guides, 498 U.S. at
553 (citing Cooter & Gell).
.

•

•

25.

See William A. McCormack et al., First Circuit, in SANCTIONS, supra note 1, at 19, 26.

26.

See FED. R. CIV P. 11 advisory committee's note paras. 12-13.
.
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and punishment of the offender, but deterrence remains the touch
stone of the Rule 11 inquiry."27
When the movant acts pro se, emphasizing deterrence over
compensation makes all the difference: because an unrepresented
party's expenses will be relatively low, little if any deterrent effect
would accrue from forcing the nonmovant to reimburse only those
expenses. Were a court to focus on compensation, it would trans
form Rule 11 into a fee-shifting statute, thereby undermining the
Supreme Court's insistence that the rule remain a mechanism for
preventing litigation abuse.28 With deterrence as the overriding
theme, the actual amount of fees incurred becomes less important
than the size of sanction required to send an effective message both
to the offender and to the bar in general.29
II.

DETERMINING

THE

APPROPRIATE SANCTION

A grant of attorney's fees to a pro se litigant follows directly
from the legislative objective of deterrence. This Part illustrates the
reasons for, and addresses the potential objections to, making an
attorney's fees award to an unrepresented party. Section II.A
explains that while trial judges have significant discretion in deter
mining the type and severity of sanctions that they can impose
under Rule 11, attorney's fees are by far the most frequent and
most logical choice. Section II.A concludes that courts should
make that same choice when the movant acts pro se. Section II.B
refutes arguments against making the award - including those
based on statutory language and on fears of granting movants
potential windfalls - in favor of honoring the deterrence rationale
that controls Rule 11.

27. Fox v. Acadia State Bank, 937 F.2d 1566, 1571 (11th Cir. 1991) (per curiam) (citing
1983 advisory committee's note).
28. See Business Guides, 498 U.S. at 533; cf. In re Kunstler {Robeson Defense Comm. v.
Britt), 914 F.2d 505, 522 {4th Cir. 1990). In a study of seventeen federal trial judges, only
three viewed compensation as the rule's primary goal. See WILLGING, supra note 1, at 23.
29. This is not to say that a compensatory element does not enter the equation at all.
Indeed, Part IV argues that the best method for calculating an appropriate award is based on
the compensation an attorney would receive for responding to the violative motion. The
point here is that compensation of the pro se movant should not be the impetus behind the
decision of what type of award to issue in the first place. Instead, the district court enjoys
wide latitude to mete out a sanction that serves the rule's dete"ent objective. See infra notes
45-50 and accompanying text. Once a judge decides, for deterrence-related reasons, to
impose a significant monetary sanction, he can calculate that figure using compensatory con
siderations. The choice of sanction is examined infra Part II.

2314
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Why Choose Attorney's Fees?

Among all the sanctions a trial judge could choose, only attor
ney's fees will fulfill the goals of Rule 11.30 Only if a court imposes
a substantial monetary sanction - only if it "hits them where it
hurts"
will parties be dissuaded from violating the rule's pre
scriptions. A sanction imposing the mere costs incurred by a pro se
litigant - for example, filing and copying costs - would be insig
nifi.cant and thus would not deter future abusive conduct.31 A fees
award, on the other hand, carries a large enough price tag that it
will serve the appropriate deterrent effect.
As an alternative, one might suggest assessing a fine payable
directly to the court.32 This approach would provide the same
deterrent effect as a fees award and simultaneously would avoid
awarding fees when none were incurred. Such a route, however,
would be unfavorable for several reasons. First, judges should
strive to treat represented and unrepresented parties consistently
-

30. One might argue that the very stigma associated with incurring a Rule 11 sanction
could, by itself, dissuade some potential violators of the rule. If the case reports and attend·
ant scholarship are any indication, however, neither judges nor academics consider that
stigma sufficient to meet the rule's objectives. See infra note 51 and accompanying text; see
also infra note 40 {discussing Rule 11 sanctions other than attorney's fees).
31. The 1983 amendment to Rule 11 added attorney's fees to the list of possible sane·
tions. See FED. R. Crv. P. 11 advisory committee's note para. 3 {1983 amendment). This
conspicuous change exemplified Congress's intent to put some bite in the rule and to discour·
age violations of it more forcefully. Awarding unrepresented parties an amount equivalent to
an attorney's fee furthers this goal. See Donaldson v. Clark, 819 F.2d 1551, 1557 {11th Cir.
1987) (en bane) {holding that the "imposition of a monetary sanction is a particularly reason·
able use of a court's discretion under Rule 11").
32. Some have argued that ordering a monetary sanction in any amount greater than the
attorney's fees actually incurred would constitute an imposition of a criminal fine for con·
tempt; such a sanction would require the procedural safeguards afforded by Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 42(b), including a higher burden of proof and, in many cases, the right to
a jury trial. See Cotner v. Hopkins, 795 F.2d 900, 903 {10th Cir. 1986) (per curiam); Nelken,
supra note 3, at 1338 & n.163. But see Eisenberg v. University of N.M., 936 F.2d 1131, 1137
{10th Cir. 1991). In Eisenberg, the Tenth Circuit distinguished - and severely limited - its
earlier decision in Cotner and held that a fine is a proper Rule 11 sanction when it is neither
arbitrary nor levied simply "to emphasize a point." See Cotner, 936 F.2d at 1136 (quoting
Magnus Elecs., Inc. v. Masco Corp., 871 F.2d 626, 634 (7th Cir. 1989)); cf. In re Yagman
(Brown v. Baden), 796 F.2d 1165, 1180-81 (9th Cir. 1986) (upholding a $250,000 award
imposed without the Rule 42 safeguards, but noting that a Rule 11 sanction could constitute a
criminal fine if the amount was "grossly disproportionate to the attorney's misconduct or
otherwise [fell] outside the bounds of the authority for the sanction").
Perhaps the most persuasive reason to refrain from equating a Rule 11 monetary sanction
with a fine for criminal contempt is that "[n]othing in the text of Rule 11 or in the A dvisory
Committee Note indicates that due process requires a court to follow the procedures called
for by [Rule 42] . . . . Both the note and policy considerations [such as limiting the sanction
hearing to facts in the record] tend to the opposite conclusion." Donaldson, 819 F.2d at 1558.
Rule 11 requires only that, in imposing any sanction, including a fine, the court afford the
nonmovant notice and the opportunity to be heard. See FED. R. Crv. P. 11(c).
The Ninth Circuit has suggested that courts employ the phrase "monetary sanction"
instead of "fine" to avoid the connotations and procedural requirements that attach to that
latter term. See In re Yagman, 796 F.2d at 1180; Miranda v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 710
F.2d 516, 521 (9th Cir. 1983), discussed in Eisenberg, 936 F.2d at 1136-37.
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- that is, they should impose similar sanctions for similarly offen
sive conduct, regardless of who the offended party might be.
Because represented parties whose opponents violate Rule 11 are
almost always granted attorney's fees,33 pro se litigants should
receive that same award.34 Second, requiring the nonmovant to pay
the fine into court would deprive the pro se litigant of any compen
sation, which is a lesser yet significant goal of the rule.35 This liti
gant, after all, did experience some compensable harm - whether
in terms of opportunity costs or in terms of the administrative costs
of responding to the offensive paper.36 Third, the advisory commit
tee itself suggests that there exist some circumstances in which the
objectives of Rule 11 can be achieved only if the sanction is paid
directly to the other party and not into court.37 Fourth, and perhaps
most important, denying the unrepresented litigant any award, or
compensating him solely for his costs, would reduce the incentive
pro se parties have to bring Rule 11 actions - and thus would
reduce enforcement of the rule itself. Once a litigant is aware that
her pro se adversary is unlikely to institute a Rule 11 proceeding,
that litigant may become more lax in monitoring and curbing her
own potentially violative behavior.38
When a party does violate Rule 11, the sanction should be only
as severe as necessary to deter the offending party and the bar.39 A
33. See infra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
34. Given that a pro se litigant himself can be sanctioned under Rule 11, see FED. R. CIV.
P. 11 advisory committee's note para. 2 (adopting the principle that the rule applies to "attor
neys and pro se litigants"), equity demands that a pro se party's adversary abide by - and
suffer the same consequences of - the rule as well.

35. For a discussion of the compensatory goal, see supra notes 24-27 and accompanying
text.

36. For a discussion of opportunity costs, see infra notes 113-15 and accompanying text.
37. The committee note states that
if a monetary sanction is imposed, it should ordinarily be paid into court as a penalty.
However, under unusual circumstances, particularly for (b)(l) violations, deterrence
may be ineffective unless the sanction not only requires the person violating the rule to
make a monetary payment, but also directs that some or all of this payment be made to
those injured by the violation.
FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee's note para. 13. Unfortunately, the committee does
not explain the rationale behind this position. It is possible that the committee finds a certain
moral appeal in having the offending party pay the offended party directly.

38. As a compromise, one might suggest assessing a sanction payable partly to the
movant and partly to the court. Cf. supra note 37 (quoting advisory committee note recog
nizing that some situations will require splitting the award between the court and the movant,
instead of paying it all into court). Doing so would obviate many of the concerns of awarding
fees when none were incurred. See infra section II.B.2. F urthermore, a court could still grant
the pro se litigant an amount sufficient to compensate him for any expenses incurred and to
retain the incentive to bring the action. On the other hand, adopting this "split payment"
approach would frustrate the consistency and ''moral appeal" goals discussed above. See
supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text; supra note 37.
39. Rule 11 admonishes that any sanction "shall be limited to what is sufficient to deter
repetition of such conduct or comparable conduct." FED. R. CIV. P. ll(c)(2). For cases
invoking this premise, see Hilton Hotels Corp. v. Banov, 899 F2d 40, 46 (D.C. Cir. 1990);
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fees award therefore might not be necessary ifa court could meet
the deterrence goal through other, nonmonetary sanctions. 4o The
reverse,however,is also true. A court may impose a sanction in
excess of the movant's attorney's fees ifthe court believes that such
a sanction is necessary to deter further violative conduct. 41
Consider the case of Rynkiewicz v. Jeanes Hospital. 42 There the
defendants moved to dismiss the pro se plaintiff 's ADEA claim
even though there was no legal basis for that motion,43 Indenying
the motion and imposing sanctions,the trial judge wrote, "Isee no
reason why the fact that plaintiff is proceeding pro se should
redound to the benefit of defendants' attorney insofar as Rule 11
sanctions are concerned." That no fees were incurred was immate
rial. The court therefore awarded the pro se litigant the amount of
a reasonable attorney's fee. 44
Because trial judges are entrusted with much discretion in effec
tuating the underlying policyof the FRCP,45 "the Civil Rules place
virtually no limits on judicial creativity." 46 Thus the advisory com
mittee encourages district courts engaging in the sanctioning
calculus to consider many different factors relating to the offending
paper. 47 Specifically,the court may weigh certain equitable factors
that do not necessarily re.fleet the expenses or fees incurred. 48
Jackson v. Law Finn of O'Hara, Ruberg, Osborne & Taylor, 875 F.2d 1224, 1229 (6th Cir.
1989); Thomas v. capital Sec. Servs., 836 F.2d 866, 878 (5th Cir. 1988) (en bane); cabell v.
Petty, 810 F.2d 463, 466 (4th Cir. 1987).
40. Other sanctions available include oral or written reprimand, referral to disciplinary
authorities, exclusion of evidence, dismissal or admission of certain elements of a pleading,
and continuing-education classes. See FED. R. Crv. P. 11 advisory committee's note 'JI 12;
WILLGING, supra note 1, at 127.
41.

See Fox v. Acadia State Bank, 937 F.2d 1566, 1571 (11th Cir. 1991) (per curiam).

42. Civ. A. No. 86-5209, 1987 WL 7842 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 11, 1987).

See 1987 WL 7842, at *2.
See 1987 WL 7842, at *3. For a discussion of what is "resonable," see infra Part IV.
45. See Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243, 252 (2d Cir. 1985); cf.
43.

44.

FED. R. Crv. P. 11 advisory committee's note
choice of sanctions).

<I

12 (declining to restrict a district court's

46. Anderson v. Beatrice Foods Co., 900 F.2d 388, 394 (1st Cir. 1990); see also Donaldson
v. Clark, 819 F.2d 1551, 1557 (11th Cir. 1987) (en bane) (affirming that trial judges have
discretion to select the type of sanction to be imposed).
For examples of truly creative sanctions, see Curran v. Price, 150 F.R.D. 85, 87 (D. Md.
1993) (ordering attorney who blatantly disregarded requirements of the federal removal stat
ute to copy out, by hand, the whole section on removal in Wright, Miller & Cooper's Federal
Practice and Procedure); Huettig & Schramm, Inc. v. Landscape Contractors Council, 582 F.
Supp. 1519, 1522-23 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (ordering counsel's law firm to pay the adversary's
attorney's fees and to circulate the judge's order to that effect among all partners and associ
ates in the firm), affd., 190 F.2d 1421 (9th Cir. 1986).
47.

See FED. R. Crv. P. 11 advisory committee's note lj[ 12 (listing relevant factors).

48. See JosEPH, supra note 1,§ 16{B)(4), at 226 (citing cases); id. § 15B, at 214; see also
Brown v. Federation of State Med. Bds., 830 F.2d 1429, 1439 (7th Cir. 1987) (noting that the
fashioning of sanctions is an equitable process).
In fact, equity would permit federal courts to award these fees even absent Rule 11. See
Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1973) (holding that an award of attorney's fees is within courts'

June 1997]

Note - Attorney's Fees

2317

Interpreting Rule 11 to include these considerations allows judges
to assess an award substantial enough to force the offending party
"to answer for [her] act." 49 At bottom, the express grant of judicial
latitude, coupled with the requirement that judges match sanctions
to the requisite degree of deterrence, ensures that courts will
impose sanctions, including attorney's fees, that reflect the offen
siveness of the violation and not the representation vel non of the
movant.50
There is a final important reason to choose attorney's fees as the
proper sanction. The use of sanctions other than attorney's fees is
rare under Rule 11.51 Presumably judges would not consistently
award these fees if the sanction did not serve the goals of the rule.
To continue achieving those goals, judges should punish similar vio
lations with similar sanctions, regardless of the movant's status.52
Thus, when a movant is unrepresented, the judge should choose the
same effective sanction that he would apply if the movant were not
proceeding pro se - that is, a fees award.
"equitable powers"); cf. Tllllothy B. Phelps, Note, Rule 11 Sanctions: Toward Judicial
Restraint, 26 WASHBURN L.J. 337, 348 (1987) (stating that the amended version of Rule 11
"clarifies that the drafters intended the courts to invoke all equitable powers" in meeting the
rule's goals). The thesis of this Note, however, is that judges need not rely on equity, nor on
their inherent power to award fees, see Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 45 (1991), nor
on the fees-award provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1994) (providing for attorney's fees when
one party "unreasonably and vexatiously" multiplies the proceedings), but instead need only
avail themselves of Rule 11 to award attorney's fees to pro se litigants.
49. Szabo Food Serv., Inc. v. Canteen Corp., 823 F.2d 1073, 1079 (7th Cir. 1987) (analo
gizing a Rule 11 sanction to a sanction for contempt). An offending party usually cannot be
made to "answer for [her] act" without paying a substantial sum, often equivalent to a rea
sonable attorney's fee. See text accompanying notes 30-32 & 37.
50. See infra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
51. See WILLGING, supra note 1, at 5 (analyzing 85 published Rule 11 decisions and find
ing nonmonetary sanctions in only two cases); Raymond Bragar, Second Circuit, in SANC
TIONS, supra note 1, at 41, 47 (finding attorney's fees the "sanction of choice" in the Second
Circuit); Nelken, supra note 3, at 1333 (finding attorney's fees awarded in 96% of Rule 11
cases studied); Jerold S. Solovy et al., Sanctions Under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, in 1 Civn. PRACTICE AND LmGATION IN FEDERAL AND STATE CoUR'IS § 11-J-3,
at 51 (Sol Schreiber et al. eds., 5th ed. 1992) (asserting that though Rule 11 provides for many
types of sanctions, "courts most commonly award attorney's fees").
52. See supra text accompanying note SO; infra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
The Second Circuit relied on a similar rationale in Chemiakin v. Yefimov, 932 F.2d 124
(2d Cir. 1991), in which the court found the appellant's appeal frivolous and awarded the pro
se appellees attorney's fees under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure ("FRAP") 38. See
932 F.2d at 125. That rule, similar to FRCP 11, provides: "If a court of appeals determines
that an appeal is frivolous, it may . . . award just damages and single or double costs to the
appellee." FED. R. APP. P. 38. The advisory committee's note to FRAP 38 states that "dam
ages" includes attorney's fees. See FED. R. APP. P. 38 advisory committee's note (1967
amendment). In granting the fees, the Second Circuit found that the appellees "suffered
considerable vexation" and that they were therefore entitled to the award notwithstanding
the fact that they had incurred no attorney's fees. See Chemiakin, 932 F.2d at 130. Because
FRCP ll(b) proscribes the very type of offensive (i.e., vexatious and frivolous) conduct
found in Chemiakin, the Second Circuit's FRAP 38 analysis firmly supports an attorney's
fees award to a pro se party under FRCP 11.
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When the violation is wilful,s3 judges are similarly more likely to
impose a fees award than any other sanction.s4 Therefore,when a
party has taken advantage of a pro se litigant's status, for example,
by inundating him with excessive motions or stimulating significant
filing costs -significant in terms of the pro se party's financial
resources -assessing an attorney's fee against the offending party
has even more appeal.
B.

Arguments for Denying the Award

Those who challenge the construction of Rule 11's attorney's
fees provision advanced in this Note launch two types of ob jec
tions.ss Section B.1 discusses the first type, which is based on a
literal interpretation of the rule's text. The phrase attorney's fees,
the argument goes, plainly precludes an award when there is no
attorney. Section B.1 demonstrates why, in light of the ramifica
tions of this strict-constructionist approach,that attack falls short.S6
The second category of ob jections encompasses more general policy
concerns about awarding fees. Section B.2evaluates these ob jec
tions,including those based on fears of granting movants a windfall
and of significantly increasing the number of Rule 11motions filed
in the district courts,and concludes that they too are unpersuasive.
1.

Statutory Construction

Rule 11 speaks of "attorney's fees . . .incurred."S7 The literal
meaning of these words presents a potential bar to any fees recov
ery by a pro se movant. Indeed, the Supreme Court has asserted
that it will "give the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure their plain
meaning ...and generally v
\ ith them as with a statute, '[w]hen we
find the terms . . . unambiguous, judicial inquiry is complete.' "SS
53.
54.

See FED. R. CIV. P. ll(b)(l) (proscribing any filing made for an "improper purpose"),
See WILLGING, supra note 1, at 31.

55. Of course, to speak of these opponents as if they were a unified force is somewhat
misleading, as the issue discussed in this Note has not received much attention in the legal
community. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. These "opponents" instead represent
an amalgam of the few judges who have issued opinions on the subject, see supra notes 42-44
and infra notes 60-62 and accompanying text, those judges and commentators who have
made similar objections in related contexts, see infra Part III, and jurists who generally
invoke the principles of strict statutory construction, see infra section 11.B.1.
56. This Note thus encourages judges to interpret the existing language of the rule to
achieve the proposed result The same result could be reached outright by amending the
language of Rule 11, although following that course is not necessary. See infra notes 66-72
and accompanying text (discussing interpretation of the Federal Rules beyond their strict
statutory language).
57. FED. R.

CIV. P.

ll(c)(2).

58. Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entertainment Group, 493 U.S. 120, 123 (1989) (citing
Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 750 n.9 (1980), and quoting Rubin v. United
States, 449 U.S. 424, 430 (1981)); see also Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic
Communications Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 533, 541 (1991).
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The Court has noted that even if it were to agree that a novel inter
pretation would effectuate the legislative policy underlying Rule 11,
"[o]ur task is to apply the text, not to improve upon it."59
The district court adopted this view in Committe v. Dennis
Reimer Co., 60 one of the few reported decisions that ask whether
pro se movants may obtain fees under Rule 11. In that case, the
court denied fees for the pro se plaintiff based on the rule's lan
guage. While the court agreed with the movant that an attorney's
fees award would further Rule 11's deterrence goal and would be
consistent with the advisory committee's note,61 it felt bound by the
plain meaning of the word "incurred" and therefore refused to
grant the fees motion.62
A second language-based argument asserts that because the
word attorney implies that an agency relationship exists between
two individuals,63 "the terms 'pro se' and 'attorney' are mutually
exclusive."64 The notion of an attorney's fee assumes that there is
one person - an attorney - charging another.65 Consequently,
this argument suggests, any of the policy justifications above including those founded on the multiple goals of deterrence, com
pensation, and punishment, and those seeking to maintain consisCaminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917), provides an early articulation of this
"plain meaning rule": "It is elementary that the meaning of a statute must, in the first
instance, be sought in the language in which the act is framed, and if that is plain
the sole
function of the courts is to enforce it according to its terms." See also 242 U.S. at 485 (stating
that when "the language is plain and admits of no more than one meaning the duty of inter
pretation does not arise").
One influential commentator, however, has suggested that lower courts do not uniformly
heed the Supreme Court's advice: "[C]ontrary to the traditional operation of the plain mean
ing rule, courts are increasingly willing to consider other indicia of intent and meaning from
the start rather than beginning their inquiry by considering only the language of the act." 2A
NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CoNSTRUCTION § 46.07, at 126 (5th ed.
1992).
•

.

.

59. Pavelic & LeFlore, 493 U.S. at 126. Though one could argue that this statement is
mere dictum and thus does not bind lower courts in fashioning an effective Rule 11 sanction,
there are stronger reasons for not adopting a strict plain-meaning approach. See infra notes
66-72 and accompanying text
60. 150 F.R.D. 495 (D. Vt. 1993).
61. The court further noted that the goals of Rule 11 differ significantly from those of
§ 1988 and that therefore the cases denying fees under that statute should not resolve the
Rule 11 inquiry. See Committe, 150 F.R.D. at 501-02; see also infra section 111.A.3 (discussing
and distinguishing the goals of§ 1988).
62. See Committe, 150 F.R.D. at 502 (requiring "payment" of fees before the award can
be granted). The district court in Salamon v. Messina, No. 87-C-2097 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
6118 (N.D. Ill. May 1, 1991), affd., Nos. 91-2248, 91-2400, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 5884 (7th
Cir. Mar. 25, 1997), similarly denied a Rule 11 fees motion made by a pro se party because
the movant represented himself. See Salamon, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6118, at *3.
63. See Duncan v. Poythress, 777 F.2d 1508, 1519-21 (11th Cir. 1985) (en bane) (Roney,
J., dissenting) (providing 24 dictionary definitions to support the claim).
64. Duncan, 777 F.2d at 1518 (Roney, J., dissenting) (discussing attorney's-fees provision
in§ 1988).
65. See Jones v. Lujan, 883.F.2d 1031, 1037 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (Silberman, J., concurring).
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tent practice under Rule 11 -would appear to fail in the face of
clear statutory language.
The literalist approach, however, falters once one appreciates
the flexibility actually afforded by the Supreme Court's interpretive
methodology·for Rule 11cases. Although the Court refused to con
strue the rule beyond its literal meaning in Pavelic & LeFlore v.
Marvel Entertainment Group,66the language of that opinion does
a ll ow for latitude in interpreting and enforcing Rule 11in some sit
uations. The Court implied that it might give weight to congres
sional policy if doing so would not require an "unnatural "
construction of the text. 67 Applying Rule 11so as to deter future
violative conduct -as this Note proposes -furthers the congres
sional ob jectives that Pavelic & LeFlore sought to protect68 and
thus seems quite consistent with a "natural " reading of the rule.
A pro se litigant's request for an attorney's fees award consti
tutes one of those "rare cases " in which, because "the literal appli
cation of a r[ ule would] produce a result demonstrably at odds with
the intentions of its drafters . . . those intentions must be control
ling."69 Unlike a case such as Pavelic & LeFlore,in which the Court
had to decide whether to extend the liability of one attorney to the
whole law firm,7othe case of the pro se litigant asks whether a court
willimpose any significant liability at a ll . A court that declined to
impose this liability certainly would be producing "a result demon
strably at odds " with the goal of Rule 11 -prevention of baseless
and harassing litigation conduct.71 Because the Court has stated
66. 493 U.S. 120 (1989);

see supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.

67. See Pavelic & LeFlore, 493 U.S. at 126 ("(W]e would not feel free to pursue that
[legislative] objective at the expense of a textual interpretation as unnatural as [has been
proposed].").
68. See Pavelic & LeFlore, 493 U.S. at 126; cf. Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 266 (1981)
(finding that the "plain-meaning rule is rather an axiom of experience than a rule of law, and
does not preclude consideration of persuasive evidence if it exists" (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Boston Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 278 U.S. 41, 48 (1928))).
Moreover, canons of statutory interpretation provide that the Federal Rules are to be con
strued liberally. See 3A SINGER, supra note 58,§ 67.10, at 87; cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (stating
that the Rules are to "be construed
to secure the just
determination of every action").
For decisions that advocate forgoing strict construction in favor of legislative policy, see Sam
uels, Kramer & Co. v. Commissioner, 930 F.2d 975, 979 (2d Cir. 1991); Rod Warren Ink v.
Commissioner, 912 F.2d 325, 326 (9th Cir. 1990); Commodity Futures Trading Commn. v.
P.I.E., Inc., 853 F.2d 721, 725 (9th Cir. 1988); Lawrence v. Staats, 640 F.2d 427, 429 (D.C. Cir.
1981). But see In re Erickson Partnership (United States v. Erickson Partnership), 856 F.2d
1068, 1070 (8th Cir. 1988) (holding that a conflict between legislative history and statutory
language is insufficient to justify departure from clear provisions).
•

•

•

•

.

•

69. Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982); accord Bob Jones Univ.
v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 586 (1983); see also Rector of Holy Trinity Church v. United
States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892) ("It is a familiar rule, that a thing may be within the letter of
the statute and yet not within the statute, because not within its spirit, nor within the inten
tion of its makers.").
70.
71.

See Pavelic & LeFlore, 493 U.S. at 121.
See supra Part I.
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that it will consider legislative intent when that intent clearly con
tradicts statutory language72 - and because fulfilling the deter
rence objective of Rule 11 necessitates reading the "attorneys' fees
. . . incurred" language more liberally than its strict construction
would permit - the plain-meaning argument ultimately must fail.
2.

Policy Concerns in Making the Award

In addition to positing objections based on statutory language,
those who oppose fees awards for pro se parties proffer broader
policy arguments to support their interpretation. They argue, for
instance, that granting fees in any amount greater than actual
expenses incurred would prove a windfall for the movant. This
argument loses force in light of two countervailing factors. First,
Rule 11 is not primarily a compensatory provision; it is about deter
ring future litigation abuse.73 Therefore, in fixing the amount of a
fees award, a district court need not rely as heavily on what the pro
se party lost as much as on the quality of the violative action.
Second,. if the choice is between granting a litigant more than he
may actually "deserve" and not punishing or not deterring behavior
that violates the norms of civil procedure, adherence to the goals of
Rule 11 counsels in favor of the former option.74 For example, in
Pelletier v. Zweifel,1s the Rule 11 movant "lost" nothing because his
insurance carrier paid for his defense; strictly speaking, he incurred
no fees. The court, however, found that the offending party was not
entitled to a "free" violation of Rule 11 on account of the defend
ant's prudence in procuring insurance. The court therefore allowed
the movant to recover fees.76 Granting a pro se litigant reasonable
attorney's fees constitutes an excessive award only if one errone
ously measures what is "reasonable" by actual costs and fees

72. See Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Cenance, 452 U.S. 155, 158 n.3 (1981) (per curiam)
(interpreting the Truth in Lending Act); supra note 69 and accompanying text. The Fifth
Circuit similarly has stated: "[S]tatutory construction must not occur in a vacuum. Statutes
are contextual as well as textual
Courts must also look to the
broad national policy
which prompted the legislation." Argosy Ltd. v. Hennigan, 404 F.2d 14, 20 (5th Cir. 1968)
(citing SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344 (1943)).
.

.

•

.

.

•

.

73. See supra Part I. Indeed, the Supreme Court has approved a sanction that inciden
tally conferred a benefit on the moving party when the sanction was necessary to carry out
Rule ll's objective. See Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications Enters., Inc.,
498 U.S. 533, 551-53 (1991) (affirming fees award over objection based on the Rules Enabling
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1994), which prohibits courts from enacting any rules that "abridge,
enlarge or modify any substantive right" embodied in the FRCP).
74.

See supra Part I.

75. 987 F.2d 716 (11th Cir. 1993) (per curiam).
76.

See 987 F.2d at 719.
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incurred and not by the other systemic costs77 that the underlying
policy of the rule seeks to reduce.
Other worries about awarding pro se litigants attorney's fees are
similarly unconvincing. The rule itself allays any concern that the
possibility of high awards will result in a proliferation of unwar
ranted Rule 11 motions, which in tum would detract attention from
the underlying causes of action. Any abuse of the judicial system,
even in a fees petition, can result in Rule 11 sanctions being
imposed on the original movant.78 The rule's deterrent aspect thus
should forestall any proliferation of distracting motions.79 Con
cerns about enlarging judges' workloads80 - even on account of
nonfrivolous fees petitions - similarly carry little weight: if courts
consistently impose sanctions, those sanctions will deter frivolous
actions and motions, and burdens on judicial dockets will decrease.
Far from controverting the goal of the attorney's-fees provision which is the worry in the statutory fee-shifting casess1 - imposition
of Rule 11 sanctions in the form of attorney's fees, even in favor of
pro se litigants, furthers the underlying objective of the rule.82
Ill.

FEE-SHIFTING PROVISIONS VERSUS RULE 11

Although courts deny pro se litigants attorney's fees almost
without exception under the Equal Access to Justice Act, the
Freedom of Information Act, and the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees
Awards Act,83 this Part argues that those courts' holdings should
77. These costs include the waste of judicial resources in hearing frivolous motions, delay
or even loss of the pro se litigant's legitimate claims, and decreased professionalism in the
bar.
78. "(T]he filing of a motion for sanctions is itself subject to the requirements of the rule
and can lead to sanctions." FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee's note para. 22; see, e.g.,
United States v. City of San Francisco, 132 F.R.D. 533 (N.D. Cal. 1990).
79. Contrary to most predictions following the 1983 amendments to Rule 11, no cottage
industry in Rule 11 motions has arisen in the federal courts. See WILLGING, supra note 1, at
109-10. There seems to be little danger of this litigation explosion because courts still can and
do readily deny frivolous motions. See Vmcent M. Waldman, Note, Pro Se Can You Sue?:
Attorney Fees for Pro Se Litigants, 34 STAN. L. REv. 659, 673 (1982).
80. See Waldman, supra note 79, at 668 (finding that pro se actions often crowd the
courts, consume much of the courts' time, and are poorly managed).
81. See infra Part III.
82. One final argument against awarding attorney's fees to a pro se litigant, which has
appeared in the FOIA context, is that any fees award would be excessive because it would
impose a penalty on the opposing party. See Waldman, supra note 79, at 668 (citing Barrett
v. Bureau of Customs, 651 F.2d 1087 (5th Cir. Unit A July 1981)). In the Rule 11 context,
this concern is not a concern at all; the rule is geared partially toward punishing offending
parties. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
83. See supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text. The great majority of cases discussing
attorney's fees for pro se parties centers on these three statutes. One court has gone so far as
to assert that there is "no fundamental difference" among the policies underlying the fees
provisions in the FOIA, the EAJA, and § 1988. See Crooker v. EPA, 763 F.2d 16, 17 (1st Cir.
1985) (per curiam).
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not control the Rule 11 analysis. In rejecting fees petitions under
those statutes, courts invoke two separate rationales. The first
focuses on the legislative policies underlying the various statutes.
Section III.A outlines those policies and demonstrates why they do
not apply to Rule 11 motions. The second rationale focuses specifi
cally on those pro se litigants who are attorneys; in that situation
courts reason that, because there is no lawyer-client relationship,
even a pro se attorney should not receive an attorney's fees award.
Section III.B concludes that although the absence of such a rela
tionship is often dispositive in the fee-shifting cases, it should not
affect the decision to grant attorney's fees to pro se litigants - lay
or legally trained - under Rule 11.
A.

Policy Goals

Rule 11 provides sanctions for litigation abuse; it is not a fee
shifting statute.84 Thus this section provides examples of cases
involving three major fee-shifting provisions and distinguishes the
policy concerns in those cases from the goals that drive Rule 11.
Insofar as these cases discuss policies that are not implicated in the
Rule 11 context, they are inapposite; insofar as the cases discuss
broader procedural goals that are not particular to the statutes in
question, their reasoning supports an award of attorney's fees to a
pro se litigant under Rule 11.
The overriding objective of the fee-shifting provisions is to
encourage litigants to seek representation in meritoriou� cases.ss
For cases denying fees under the three statutes, see infra notes 89, 92, 95. Though a few
appellate courts have affirmed an award of fees under these statutes in the past, see, e.g.,
Duncan v. Poythress, 777 F.2d 1508 (11th Cir. 1985) (en bane) (§ 1988); Cazalas v. United
States Dept. of Justice, 709 F.2d 1051 (5th Cir. 1983) (FOIA); Cuneo v. Rumsfeld, 553 F.2d
1360 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (FOIA), their holdings have now been either expressly - in the case of
§ 1988 - or implicitly - in the cases of the FOIA and the EAJA - overruled by the
Supreme Court's § 1988 decision in Kay v. Ehrler, 499 U.S. 432 (1991). See infra section
III.A.3 (discussing Kay). After Kay, the D.C. Circuit recognized that it could no longer
countenance the award of attorney's fees to pro se litigants under § 1988 or the FOIA. See
Benavides v. Bureau of Prisons, 993 F.2d 257, 259 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (denying fees under the
FOIA). The D.C. Circuit's rationale extends easily to EAJA motions as well.
84. See Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 533,
553 (1991} (citing Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 393, 409 (1990)); Doering
v. Union County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 857 F.2d 191, 194 (3d Cir. 1988) ("[T]he Rule's
primary purpose is not 'wholesale fee-shifting but [rather] correction of litigation abuse.' "
(quoting Gaiardo v. Ethyl Corp., 835 F.2d 479, 483 (3d Cir. 1987) (alteration in original)});
see also Melissa Nelken et al., U.S. Supreme Court, in SANCTIONS, supra note 1, at 9, 12; supra
notes 28-29 and accompanying text. Thus any attempt to analyze or interpret the rule as a
fee-shifting mechanism - or to analogize to other fee-shifting provisions - is misplaced.
See WILLGING, supra note 1, at 175-76 (citing Schwarzer, supra note 1).
85. See infra notes 86-99 and accompanying text; Karen Shulman, Comment, To Fee, or
Not to Fee: The Dilemma ofthe Pro Se Attorney In Collecting Attorney's Fees, 16 W. ST. U. L.

REv. 303, 311 (1988). Shulman observes that these provisions are designed to "remove eco
nomic obstacles to legitimate claims." Id. Obviously, courts enforcing those statutes should
seek to honor that objective. To the extent that Rule 11 courts also choose to place that dual
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Whereas those provisions concentrate on vindicating the rights of
the moving party, Rule 11 focuses on deterring the conduct of the
offending party. As such, the particular characteristics of the Rule
11 movant are less important than the quality and degree of the
offense.
1.

The Equal Access to Justice Act

The primary goal of the BAJA is to increase accessibility to the
courts for plaintiffs whose means would otherwise preclude them
from challenging governmental action.86 By granting fees to parties
litigating against the government, the statute encourages individuals
to vindicate their rights, through an attorney, when the govern
ment's position is unreasonable.87 Because success on the merits is
less probable when a party is unrepresented - a skilled attorney is
more likely than a layperson to identify the government's weak
arguments88 - representation by counsel in an BAJA action is
essential to the effectuation of congressional policy. For this rea
son, courts have been reluctant to grant fees to pro se litigants
under the BAJA; doing so, they fear, would implicitly endorse the
practice of proceeding pro se and would thereby contradict the
BAJA's objectives.89 By contrast, legal representation has little
bearing on the principles underlying Rule 11. That rule focuses on
the conduct of the opposing party, not on the arguments of the
movant. The concern is not whether the pro se litigant can put
forth his strongest arguments on the underlying cause of action, but
whether his opponent will abide by the strictures of Rule 11.90
Allowing a party to proceed without an attorney thus does not frus
trate the aims of Rule 11 's attorney's-fees provision.
One might contend that representation of the pro se litigant
could bear on the effectuation of Rule 11 policy in the following
emphasis on economic costs and meritorious arguments, they will grant the attorney's fees
and thereby create an economic disincentive to file frivolous, i.e. meritless, papers.
86. See SEC v. Price Waterhouse, 41 F.3d 805, 809 {2d Cir. 1994) (Leval, J., dissenting in
part) (emphasizing compensation of the plaintiff); Celeste v. Sullivan, 988 F.2d 1069, 1070
{11th Cir. 1992) (per curiam) (emphasizing meritorious claims); Crooker v. EPA, 763 F.2d 16,
17 (1st Cir. 1985) (per curiam) (emphasizing vindication of private parties' rights); see also
Deborah Weinstein, Recent Decision, 63 TEMP. L. REv. 865, 867, 868 n.22 (1990) (discussing
Jones v. Lujan, 883 F.2d 1031 (D.C. Cir. 1989)).
87. See Louise L Hill, An Analysis and Explanation of the Equal Access to Justice Act, 19
Aruz. ST. LJ. 229, 234 & n.28, 243 (1987).
88. Cf. Barrett v. Bureau of Customs, 651 F.2d 1087, 1089-90 (5th Cir. Unit A July 1981)
(discussing the benefits of representation under the Privacy Act, which contains fee.shifting
language nearly identical to that of the EAJA).
89. See, e.g., Price Waterhouse, 41 F.3d at 808; Hexamer v. Foreness, 997 F.2d 93 (5th Cir.
1993) (per curiam); Celeste, 988 F.2d at 1070; Demarest v. Manspeaker, 948 F.2d 655 (10th
Cir. 1991); Naekel v. Department of Transp., 845 F.2d 976, 981 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Merrell v.
Block, 809 F.2d 639, 642 (9th Cir. 1987); Crooker, 763 F.2d at 16.
90. See supra text accompanying notes 16-19.
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way: The pro se litigant's adversary might believe that only an
attorney, and not an unrepresented party, would be vigilant enough
to recognize and prosecute a Rule 11 violation. If so, the offending
party might think twice before running afoul of the rule if the
potential movant were to have an attorney. A court might there
fore choose to deny the fees and not to "reward" a party who repre
sented himself - with the intention of encouraging parties to retain
an attorney, thereby discouraging litigation abuse. The argument
falls short, however, on closer examination. In the statutory con
text refusing to grant pro se litigants attorney's fees gives parties an
incentive to hire an attorney at the commencement of the action.
The Rule 11 movant, on the other hand, does not decide at the
outset of his case whether or not to hire a lawyer simply based on
the possibility of suffering a Rule 11 violation down the road.
Denying the fees under Rule 11, as opposed to under the BAJA,
will not encourage litigants to seek representation in future cases,
and thus does not further the goals of Rule 11.
2.

The Freedom of Information Act

The goal of the FOIA's fees-award provision is to compensate
plaintiffs for any costs and fees legitimately incurred in holding the
government to the disclosure requirements of the Act.91 The Sixth
Circuit, in Falcone v. IRS, observed that because the plaintiff in that
case never experienced the financial burden that Congress designed
the FOIA's fee-shifting provision to relieve, he was not entitled to
the fees award.92 Falcone thus suggests that an award of attorney's
fees hinges on the evil at which the fees provision is directed.
Under this policy prescription - as opposed to the statutory goals
particular to the FOIA93 - a court should award fees only when
the movant experiences the rule's enunciated harm. Accordingly,
when a pro se party suffers a Rule 11 violation, courts should not
hesitate to award him attorney's fees:94 after a Rule 11 violation,
91. See Falcone v. IRS, 714 F.2d 646 (6th Cir. 1983). Other courts have interpreted the
FOIA's goals similarly, with some slight variations. See, e.g., Benavides v. Bureau of Prisons,
993 F.2d 257, 260 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (stating that the goal is "virtually identical" to that found
in § 1988 - to facilitate access to the courts); Cazalas v. United States Dept of Justice, 709
F.2d 1051, 1057 (5th Cir. 1983) (stating that the goal is to remove monetary barriers to ensur
ing governmental compliance with the FOIA); Cunningham v. FBI, 664 F.2d 383, 387 (3d Cir.
1981) (asserting that the goal is to "remove obstacles to legitimate claims").

92. See Falcone, 714 F.2d at 647 (noting that plaintiff never incurred the "burden of legal
[fees]" that the rule was intended to alleviate). For other decisions denying attorney's fees to
pro se litigants under the FOIA, see Benavides, 993 F.2d at 260; Cunningham, 664 F.2d at
388; Crooker v. United States Dept of the Treasury, 634 F.2d 48 (2d Cir. 1980).
93.

See cases cited supra note 91 and accompanying text.

94. In Benavides, 993 F.2d 257, the appellate court chose not to accept the petitioner's
argument that the FOIA's underlying goal was one of deterrence, and it denied the fees
motion. The court's decision may lend indirect support to an award under Rule 11, however:
the Benavides opinion characterizes deterrence as a mere "serendipitous by-product" of
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the pro se movant (and the judicial system overall) has experienced
exactly the type of harm that Congress hoped to curtail - namely,
defending against frivolous or abusive pleadings.
3.

Section 1988

The Supreme Court's decision in Kay v. Ehrler,9s a § 1988 case,
effectively closed the book on awarding fees to pro se litigants
under most statutory fee-shifting provisions. Ironically, however,
the reasoning behind the Court's denial of fees supports an award
of attorney's fees to pro se litigants under Rule 11. The Kay Court
relied on Congress's intention of helping civil rights plaintiffs retain
competent counsel.96 Congress, the Court asserted, was concerned
with the "effective prosecution of meritorious claims,"97 a goal that
could be best met only if a party were represented by an attorney.
Because Kay proceeded pro se, the Court denied him his fees
request. To the extent the Kay holding depends on specific legisla
tive policy, it is inapposite, as the goals of Rule 11 are significantly
different from those of § 1988.98 To the extent the Kay opinion
exemplifies the Court's desire to encourage meritorious claims and
to satisfy legislative intent, it actually supports a fees award under
Rule 11: the deterrent effect of such a sanction will be to encourage
attorneys to examine the merits of their pleadings more closely
before filing them.99
B.

The Absence of an Agency Relationship

Although the Kay Court concluded that the goals of § 1983
would be ill served if the Court were to award fees to a plaintiff
attorney who represented himself,100 this section demonstrates that
the goals of Rule 11 can be met equally well no matter whether the
sanctions under the FOIA. See 993 F.2d at 260. This language could suggest that when
deterrence is the central goal of a statute, a court might be more amenable to awarding a pro
se party attorney's fees.
95. 499 U.S. 432 (1991).
96. See 499 U.S. at 435-36.
97. 499 U.S. at 437. The appellate court in this case similarly noted that "attorney's fees
. . . under section 1988 are not awarded as penalties or sanctions." Kay v. Ehrler, 900 F.2d
967, 972 (6th Cir. 1990). A Rule 11 award by definition is intended as a sanction. See supra
note 2 (quoting Rule 11).
98. See supra Part I.
99. To be sure, there is a difference between encouraging meritorious actions - the goal
of § 1988 - and discouraging meritless ones - the goal of Rule 11. See Kay, 499 U.S. at 437.
If the goal of § 1988, however, is to allow aggrieved parties to vindicate their rights, it seems
appropriate to extend the Kay rationale to the Rule 11 context, in which movants defend
their right - and the right of the court - to be free from abusive litigation tactics.
100. See Kay, 499 U.S. at 438. The Court declared that even though the movant was a
competent attorney, he lacked the objective judgment necessary to argue his case most effec
tively. See 499 U.S. at 437.

,
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movant is represented or not, and no matter whether he is an attor
ney or not.101
In refusing to award fees, both Kay and Falcone emphasized the
absence of an attorney-client relationship.102 The Falcone court
assumed that even though the pro se litigant was an attorney by
trade, he did not have the " 'detached and objective perspective'
necessary to fulfill the aims of the Act."103 The objectivity of a
Rule 11 movant, by contrast, does not implicate the goals of that
rule because whether the movant is or is not an attorney has no
relation to the opposition's conduct. Each party bears the burden
of conducting itself according to the rules, regardless of whether its
adversary has legal representation. Indeed, there should be no
need to require a pro se party to hire an attorney just to keep a
represented party honest. There is thus no reason to require an
attorney-client relationship before punishing a party who violates
the rule and awarding attorney's fees to the pro se movant.
At best, a litigant will engage in behavior that violates Rule 11
regardless of her pro se adversary's status; at worst, she will try to
take advantage of that status and the attendant lack of legal acu
men, or lack of objectivity, or both. In that latter case there is all
the more reason to impose a significant sanction in order to deter
such abuse. The district court underscored this view in Rynkiewicz
v. Jeanes Hospital: "If anything, this duty [to abide by the require
ments of Rule 11] was heightened by the fact that plaintiff was pro
ceeding pro se, and thus without the advantage of having an
attorney" who could better recognize the shortcomings of the oppo
sition's arguments and the nature of its tactics.104
IV.

CALCULATING THE

AWARD

Once a court decides that it should award the pro se litigant
reasonable attorney's fees, it must determine the actual sum. The
calculation of any fees award in favor of a pro se party is admittedly
an inexact process.105 This Part proposes that courts invoke tradi
tional methods of determining a reasonable fee while also relying
101. The argument in this section is slightly different from that addressed supra section
11.B.1. That section answers objections based solely on the text of Rule 11 and concludes that
that language does not foreclose a fees award. The analysis in this section poses the broader
question of whether, as a policy matter, we nonetheless should demand that an attorney be
retained before awarding Rule 11 attorney's fees; this section concludes that we should not.
102. See Kay, 499 U.S. at 435-36; Falcone v. IRS, 714 F.2d 646, 647-48 (6th Cir. 1983).
103. Falcone, 714 F.2d at 647 (quoting White v. Arlen Realty & Dev. Corp., 614 F.2d 387,
388 (4th Cir. 1980) (per curiam)); see also supra note 100.
104. See Rynkiewicz v. Jeanes Hosp., Civ. A. No. 86-5209, 1987 WL 7842, at *2 (E.D. Pa.
Mar. 11, 1987).
105. See Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 720 (5th Cir. 1974)
(observing that the award is discretionary and lacks "mathematical precision"); Pilkington v.
Bevilacqua, 522 F. Supp. 906, 910 (D.R.I. 1981) (contending that, under § 1988, there can be
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on their discretion to fashion an award that best serves the policies
of Rule 11.106
Rule 11 contemplates an award commensurate with the amount
necessary to deter the offensive conduct. Thus although courts may
consider the costs incurred by the movant,101 the reasonable-fees
award will not necessarily match the actual amount paid.1os Courts
should look beyond what fees a litigant did or did not incur and
instead should ascertain the amount necessary to deter offensive
litigation conduct.109
In determining this amount, courts should consider what an
attorney would have charged for the requisite work performed by
the pro se litigant. This lodestar approachllO has appeal both in its
simplicity and in its acceptance in other areas of the law.111 It may
have little relation to the value of the pro se litigant's work in a
particular case, however, as he can neither command as high a rate
nor complete the work in as little time as could a practicing attor
ney. Nonetheless, the method does provide a judge with a rough
indication of how large a sanction may be necessary to prevent
future offensive conduct - indeed, the text of Rule 11 suggests that
an award equal to reasonable attorney's fees often will serve the
appropriate deterrent effect.112
Courts could choose instead to base the award on the movant's
lost opportunity costs.113 This approach would serve the rule's secno mathematical formula for calculating the award because the pro se litigant incurs no legal
fees).
106. Recall Justice Marshall's admonition that "[o]ne of the fundamental purposes of
Rule 11 is to strengthen the hand of the trial judge in his efforts to police abusive litigation
practices and to provide him sufficient flexibility to craft penalties appropriate to each case."
Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entertainment Group, 493 U.S. 120, 127 (1989) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). The advisory committee similarly advocates a discretionary approach. See Feo.
R. CIV P. 11 advisory committee's note paras. 17-18 (committing the determination of a
sanction to the trial court's discretion and providing for case-by-case evaluation); see also
Johnson, 488 F.2d at 720.
107. See FED. R. CIV P. ll (c)(2) (allowing for "reasonable attorneys' fees and other
expenses incurred as a direct result of the violation").
108. See Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs., Inc., 836 F.2d 866, 879 (5th Cir. 1988) (en bane).
109. See Pavelic & LeFlore, 493 U.S. at 126 (stating that the purpose of Rule 11 is to
sanction the offending party, not to reimburse the offended party).
110. The "lodestar" is commonly defined as the "number of hours reasonably expended
multiplied by [the] prevailing hourly rate in [the] community for similar work." BLACK'S
LAw DICTIONARY 941 (6th ed. 1990).
111. The Supreme Court, for example, adopted the lodestar approach for § 1988 cases in
Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983).
112. See FEo. R. CIV P. ll (c)(2).
113. See Waldman, supra note 79, at 680-81 for a discussion of opportunity costs. One
district court has intimated that lost income should be a factor in awarding fees to a pro se
litigant under the EAJA. See SEC v. Kaufman, 835 F. Supp. 157, 159 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), affd.
sub nom SEC v. Price Waterhouse, 41 F.3d 805 (2d Cir. 1994).
Although the Sixth Circuit based its denial of fees in Kay partly on the fact that opportu
nity costs are not the same as pecuniary losses and thus should not enter the § 1988 analysis,
.

.

.
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ondary goal of compensation, though it might achieve minimal
deterrence if the opportunity costs were relatively low. Calculating
these costs, moreover, presents problems of subjective valuation
and high administrative costs.114 Furthermore, because courts do
not award opportunity costs to represented parties as part of their
attorney's fees award, maintaining consistent treatment of all mov
ants requires that courts deny such costs to pro se litigants as
wen.115 A pro se litigant might receive absolutely nothing, however
- and an offending party would get off scot-free
if courts were
to deny the movant both opportunity costs and attorney's fees. As
noted above, resorting to opportunity costs seems ill advised given
Rule ll's emphasis on deterrence. We thus return to reasonable
attorney's fees as the most sensible measure of the award.
-

Perhaps the strongest set of criteria for determining a "reason
able" attorney's fee is found in Johnson v. Georgia Highway
Express, Inc.116 The twelve Johnson factors,117 which generally con
sider the time and skill required for the work, compose the standard
calculus for a Rule 11 sanction in many courts.118 Many of those
criteria, however, do not arise in the pro se context, so a court
would be better off concentrating not on the distinct factors them
selves but on the policy that underlies them. That policy - implicit
in the twelve enumerated factors - entails a combination of what
amount would be reasonable given, in descending order of impor
tance, the offense and the response required, the necessary degree
see Kay v. Ehrler, 900F.2d 967, 971 (6th Cir. 1990), the Supreme Court did not address this
issue.
114. Courts could reduce those problems by equating the value of leisure time with the
value of time spent at work - that is, by using the litigant's hourly wage to calculate oppor
tunity costs. When a litigant has either no job or a low-paying job, however, this calculation
would produce a figure too low to serve any deterrent effect. Thus, compensating the pro se
party for his time and effort seems a necessary but insufficient approach to the problem.
115. See Cunningham v.FBI, 664F.2d 383, 386 (3d Cir. 1981); supra text accompanying
notes 33-34, 52.
116. 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974).
117. The twelve factors are time and labor required; novelty and difficulty of the work
performed; requisite skill; preclusion of other employment; customary fee in the community;
whether the fee was fixed or contingent; time limitations imposed by the court or by other
circumstances; amount of money involved and results obtained; experience, ability, and repu
tation of the attorney; "undesirability" of the case; nature and length of the attorney-client
relationship; and awards in similar cases. See Johnson, 488 F2d at 717-19.
118. See, e.g., Rum Creek Coal Sales, Inc. v. Caperton, 31F.3d 169, 175 (4th Cir. 1994);
Davis v. City of SanFrancisco, 976F2d 1536, 1546 (9th Cir. 1992); Homeward Bound, Inc. v.
Hissom Meml. Ctr., 963F.2d 1352, 1356 (10th Cir. 1992); Leffler v. Meer, 936F2d 981, 985 &
n.2 (7th Cir. 1991); United StatesFootball League v. NationalFootball League, 887F.2d 408,
415 (2d Cir. 1989).
Some commentators have suggested that the Johnson criteria differ little from that of the
simpler lodestar approach. See Third Circuit TaskForce, Court Awarded Attorney Fees, 108
F.R.D. 237, 244 (1985). The TaskForce noted that the first and most heavily weighted John
son factor is time and labor expended. See id.
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of compensation, and the desire to provide a check against arbitrary
awards.
Reading the Johnson criteria in this way reinforces the notion
that judges calculating an attorney's fees award for a pro se litigant
enjoy wide latitude limited only by considerations of deterrence
and fairness - considerations that underlie Rule 11 itself. Because
a Rule 11 sanction will almost always be case specific,119 tempering
rigid formulae such as the lodestar or the Johnson approach with
judicial discretion ensures that judges will impose attorney's fees
awards that adequately deter improper and frivolous filings.
CONCLUSION
"Allowing a citizen who hired an attorney to get fees but not
[making the award to pro se litigants] creates a windfall for the
defendant who doesn't have to pay the fees . . . just because he had
the good fortune to commit his wrong" upon an unrepresented
party.120 Beyond creating a windfall, denying the pro se party an
attorney's-fees award controverts express legislative policy. Any
objections to making the award that are based on a strict interpreta
tion of the rule's language or on fee-shifting provisions in other
statutes must fail in the face of Congress's, the bar's, and society's
insistence on deterring offensive and abusive litigation practices.
Granting the pro se litigant attorney's fees does no more than
ensure that parties play by the rules and that they suffer the appro
priate consequences when they transgress those rules.

119. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee's note para. 12; supra note 106.
120. Shulman, supra note 85, at 310. Though this statement refers to pro se attorneys
who sue under statutory fee-shifting provisions, it is equally applicable to Rule 11 cases.

